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Hastings Center Report, July-August 1994

Scarcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question.
Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in
their daily controversies, the ideas, and
even the language, peculiar to judicial pro.
ceeding.s . ... The language ofthe law thus
becomes, in some measure, a vulgar
tongue; the spirit of the law, which is pro.
duced in the schools and courts ofjustice,
gradually penetrates beyond their waUs
into the bosom of society, where it descends
to the lowest classes, so that at last the
whole people contract the habits and the
tastes of the judicial magistrate.
-Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America
hat happens when the language of the law becomes a
vulgar tongue? What happens, more particularly,
when parties to bioethical discourse
are obliged to borrow in their daily
controversies the ideas, and even the
language, peculiar to judicial proceedings? How suited are the habits,
taste, and language of the judicial
magistrate to the political, and more
particularly, the bioethical, questions
of our time?
We ask these questions because, as
the incomparable Tocqueville foresaw, Americans today truly do resolve
political-and moral--questions into
judicial questions. As Abraham Lincoln hoped, the Constitution "has become the political religion of the nation," and many Americans now
"take for granted that the Constitution embodies moral as well as legal
rules." We revere the Supreme Court
as the great arbiter of American
moral life, as performing a "prophetic function," as expressing what "we
stand for as a people." Trial courts,
L.A. Law wants to teach us, are forums for the apotheosis of social and
moral reasoning. The legalist error
proliferates that "moral rights [necessarily] represent claims that ought to
be made in legal rights, that ought to
be protected and enforced by law. "1
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Bioethics in the
Language of the Law
by Carl E. Schneider

Law provides a rich language for thinking about bioethical
issues and is a tool for action as well as talk. But the language of the law, often inapt, regularly fails to achieve its
desired effect.

Inevitably, the spirit of the law has
penetrated into the bosom of bioethics. For one thing, the two fields
are not wholly distinct: many bioethicists are lawyers, including several
prominent staff members of several
influential commissions. 2 For another, bioethics is as much a political
movement as an academic discipline.
This has given bioethicists an incentive to learn and speak the language
of the law. Further, bioethical issues
have been framed for public discussion in legal terms in cases from Qy,inlan to Cruzan, in the tribulations and
trials of Baby Doe and Baby M, in
the constitutional principles of Roe v.
Wade, in legislative reforms of law at
the end of life, in referenda in Washington and California, in the law's
travails with Jack Kevorkian. Finally,
the spirit of the law has penetrated
into the bosom ofbioethics because it
has penetrated into the bosom of
society generally: bioethicists partake
of the habits and tastes of their time
and place, and those habits and tastes
are in no small part those of the judicial magistrate.
It would be easier to see the consequences of formulating bioethical
issues in legal terms if we knew bioethics' "native language," how it
would speak freed of legal influences.
For the reasons I just gave, that counterfactual is unimaginable. We can,
however, identify qualities we want
bioethical discourse to have, and

then ask if the language of the law
promotes them. I take bioethics to be
the study of those ethical problems
relating to health care and ranging
from questions about how a particular doctor and patient should make a
specific decision to questions about
how American health care should be
ethically structured. Such questions
are extraordinarily perplexing, raising as they do the most basic and
intractable issues about human life
and the most intricate and intimate
issues about human relationships. I
assume that to treat so wide a range
of such baffling problems, a rich vocabulary of ethical considerations,
styles, and approaches is necessary.
Different bioethical issues arising in
different contexts may demand a regime of rules or the flexibility of discretion, a rights discourse or a language of duties, public policy analysis
or private preference, the salvation of
religion or the neutrality of liberalism, the profits of principles or the
insights of casuistry, the uses of utilitarianism or the devices of deontology, the rigors of economics or the
consolations of philosophy. In my
father's house there are many mansions.
I will argue that the language of the
law has enriched bioethical discourse. Law has done so by generating vivid and pressing instantiations
of bioethical issues, by scrutinizing
them-in part-in moral terms, and
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by proffering means of resolving
them. It has contributed vocabulary
and concepts to bioethical discourse
and offered ways of putting those
words and ideas into practice. But the
law's gifts to bioethical discourse and
to effectuating that discourse should
be cautiously received. For the law
has goals that go beyond the immediate problems of bioethics, and those
goals peculiarly shape the moral
terms the law employs and specially
alter the direction legal discourse
takes. Furthermore, the law has limits
that arise from its special social purpose, and those limits crimp the usefulness of law's language as a vehicle
for bioethical discourse.
Law is essentially a device for social
regulation. It is the means by which
society through its government seeks
to establish a framework for human
interactions. This framework helps
set minimum standards for human
behavior (criminal law and tort law
exemplify this function), helps establish and support the institutions and
practices people use in organizing
their relations with each other (this is
what contract and commercial law,
for instance, do), and helps people
resolve their disputes (which is a primary function of civil courts). In this
century, the law has broadened that
framework by providing some minimum assurances of human wellbeing (what we call the welfare state).
Law's calling as a device for social
regulation is its boon and bane as a
language ofbioethics. As boon, law's
attractions are two. First, it provides a
highly developed, conceptually fertile, analogically abundant, professionally precise, systematically disciplined language for thinking about
bioethical issues, a rich language
Holmes called "the witness and external deposit of our moral life. ,s Second, law provides a tool not just for
talk, but for action. As bane, law's
disadvantages are also two. First, its
language is often inapt. Second, it
regularly fails to achieve its desired
effect, and sometimes seems to have
hardly any effect at all.
The Language of the Law
We turn now to law's first attraction
as a language for bioethical discourse. Because law has centuries of

experience with social regulation, it
offers a highly articulated method
and language for analyzing social
problems. That method, in America,
is the common law process: courts
build legal principles incrementally,
by evaluating one case at a time;
legislatures intermittently respond
with reforms and reconsiderations.
One might think of it as Rawls's reflective equilibrium in action. It is a
method well suited to a field as new
and febrile as bioethics, since it
brings to bear long-nurtured principles on emerging problems. And it
is a method particularly congenial to
medicine and applied ethics, since,
like them, it relies in important ways
on cases.
This almost dialectical, common
law method has over the last millennium elaborated a language of social
regulation. That language includes a
vocabulary not just of terms, but of
conceptual, organizing ideas. Three
sets of ideas form idioms that particularly influence bioethical debate and
that will repay attention: law's dispute-resolution function, its facilitative function, and its rights discourse.
One of law's oldest aims is to help
people resolve disputes. American
law does so partly through the law of
torts. When one person injures
another, the law may authorize a tort
suit. This is the legal remedy when
one person strikes another with his
fist, runs over another with his car,
sells another a defective product, or
commits professional malpractice.
The tort action provides a way of settling the dispute between the ir:tiurer
and the victim and of restoring the
victim to his prior well-being. By setting the substantive terms for resolving disputes, tort law also establishes a
standard of behavior which-one
hopes-may shape conduct so that
injuries are deterred, disputes are
forestalled, and, even, people behave
better.
Because the language of torts provides a convenient pattern for thinking about those bioethical issues that
arise where one person has injured
another, it has seemed a promising
response where doctors abuse their
power over patients. Building on tort
doctrines (like the principle that
people may not be touched unless
they have given their consent), courts

have developed a principle of informed consent This principle serves
three bioethical goals: to help resolve
disputes over injuries caused by a
doctor's fuilure to inform a patient
adequately; to recompense-however crudely-the injured patient;
and-more ambitiously-to improve
the way doctors treat patients.
The law tries to conduce to good
not just through tort law, but also
through what I call the facilitative
function-by, that is, lending people
the law's authority to use in organizing their relations with each other. A
familiar example of this function is
the law of contracts, which allows
people to reach whatever agreements
about their affairs they desire, and to
deploy the law's power to make those
agreements binding and thus predictable and reliable. The facilitative
function also lets people recruit the
law's force to give binding effect to
their personal preferences. Two common examples of this are the will and
the power of attorney, which permit
people to dispose of their property as
they wish or to allocate that power to
someone else.
As bioethics began to hunt for ways
of enhancing the power of patients,
the idiom of the facilitative function
attractively presented itself. Some
people have, for example, sought to
reform the relationship between doctors and patients by treating it in contractual terms. (This effort has foundered because of a classic problem
with contract law: contracts tend to
ratify preexisting differences in
power.) More successful have been
analogies to the law of wills and the
law of agency (the law authorizing
powers of attorney). Out of those
analogies have arisen the living will
and the durable power of attorney,
devices that extend the authority of
patients to control their medical
treatment when they can no longer
think and act for themselves.
Finally, as Cardozo said, "The great
ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with
general principles, by enshrining
them in constitutions." This process
evokes the language of rights, a Ian-
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guage that has achieved a potence
and preeminence in the United
States unmatched anywhere in the
world. That language is woefully
muddled by our tendency to conflate
moral rights, statutory rights, and
constitutional rights. But constitutional rights are undoubtedly the
trump cards of our legal system.

drawbacks arise from law's role as a
means of social regulation. More
specifically, the law's language is
shaped for a system with a particular
aim-social regulation. That aim itself is a limited one-to shape and
not to supplant social practices and
institutions. And the law is a blunt
chisel even for that task.

The law's rights discourse has seemed delightfully suited
to that engine of bioethical thought, the doctrine of
autonomy.

Once recognized, they massively prevail against statutes that infringe on
them. What is more, they have not
just a legal, but also a luminous social
and moral authority.
The law's rights discourse has
seemed delightfully suited to that engine of bioethical thought, the doctrine of autonomy. Thus proponents
of one set ofbioethical positions have
enlisted the doctrine of constitutional rights with overwhelming effect in the law of reproduction generally and abortion specifically. Because
the debate over that law was phrased
in rights terms, its language, tone,
content, and result have been transformed. And proponents of another
position have similarly labored, with
some profit, to transpose the discourse about euthanasia into a debate over a-constitutional-right to
die.
In America, then, the language of
the law lies easy on the tongue. It
abounds in productive principles and
illuminating analogies. It provides familiar and powerful tools for analyzing many social problems, including
many bioethical issues. And to a notable extent, bioethical discourse has
been phrased in legal terms, has been
conducted in courts and legislatures,
and has won legal reforms. But alluring as the law's language is, it has
drawbacks and limits that are notalways perceived or understood. like
the attractions of that language, these

First, the idioms of the law are
often less apt than they might appear.
They have arisen in response to
needs for social regulation, but the
systemic imperatives that shape the
law are sometimes a poor pattern for
bioethical discourse. For example,
the law of torts is centrally a way of
compensating victims of an injury.
But bioethicists have wanted the law
of informed consent not just to remedy specific failures to inform patients, but to fundamentally reform
the relationship between doctors and
patients. However, tort law ill suits this
ambitious goal. For one thing, the
language of torts is the language of
wrongs. That language states only
minimum duties; it is not the language of aspiration. A doctor may
obey it through quite mechanical and
sadly unsatisfactory routines that
mock the dialogue bioethicists imagine for doctors and patients. Furthermore, the law penalizes the breach of
even those minimal duties only
sporadically-when a patient has actually been injured by that breach,
when the injury is great enough to
justifY the expenses of a suit, and
when the patient realizes all this and
is willing to sue.
More broadly, not just tort law, but
the law generally, is inept at shaping
relationships-particularly relationships that are instinct with intimacy.
The field that tries most direcdy to do
so-family law-is perhaps the sorri-

est of law's enterprises. As James Fitzjames Stephen wrote, "To try to regulate the internal affairs of a family, the
relations of love or friendship, or
many other things of the same sort,
by law or by the coercion of public
opinion, is like trying to pull an eyelash out of a man's eye with a pair of
tongs. They may put out the eye, but
they will never get hold of the eyelash. "5 Familial affairs involve relations among people who deal with
each other in private on a personal
basis concerning intimately personal
questions and consulting personal
values that are passionately felt In
such affairs, it is hard for law to learn
what is going on in the relationship,
to write rules that will fit each relationship, to supervise it, and to induce people to follow those rules and
cooperate with that supervision.
The relationship between doctor
and patient is not always all that it
might be, and it is sometimes more
bureaucratic than personal. But it
can partake, and its members often
want it to partake, of those qualities
that make it inapt for the law's regime. Thus trying to organize that
relationship through tort law may be
an example of what Judith Shklar disparagingly calls "the structuring of all
possible human relations into the
form of claims and counterclaims
under established rules. "6
A second drawback of analyzing
bioethical problems in legal terms is
that law is a system of social regulation,
a system whose parts should mesh
into what Holmes called "a thoroughly connected system, "7 that is, a
(reasonably) coherent body of precedent and principle. Jurists have worried for centuries that changing one
area will unexpectedly alter another.
Such concerns help explain, for instance, the Supreme Court's decision
in Cruzan, 8 in which the Court was
asked to declare a constitutional right
to die. The Court might have done so
except for Roe v. Wade, 9 which established a right to an abortion. The
court has been reconsidering Roe,
and several justices regret ever embogging themselves in the jurisprudential and political quagmire of
abortion and its questions of constitutional interpretation and federalism.
Whatever the moral appeal of the
Cruzans' right-to-die argument, ac-
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cepting it would have reinforced Roe
and its expansionist view of constitutional analysis and judicial power.
Thus even a justice who liked much
in the Cruzans' argument might have
rejected it for fear of its systemic implications.
This point can be put somewhat
differently. Every judicial opinion
looks forward as well as backward;
every opinion is both based on precedent and itself becomes precedent.
Yet a court cannot easily anticipate
what kind of precedent an opinion
will become, for the cases and arguments it will govern are cloaked in the
mists of the future. The resulting fear
of the unforeseen consequences of
each legal precedent is one reason
slippery-slope arguments are so common and so telling in law. Anticipating consequences is particularly urgent where, as in Cruzan and Roe,
"privacy" rights are at stake. To maintain the vigor of those rights, the
Court has made it structurally arduous to justify a statute that conflicts
with them. Yet this has introduced a
crucial and almost perverse rigidity in
the law: the Court hesitates to define
interests as "rights" because that decision's consequences are so severe.
The stronger the doctrine of rights,
then, the more reluctant the Court
must be to deploy it. Thus the m<9ority in Cruzan declined to find a "right
to die" in the Constitution partly for
fear of what Cardozo called the "tendency of a principle to extend itself to
the limits of its logic. "10
Seen in this light, Cruzan is not
hard to understand. The Court faced
several kinds of systemic pressure to
cabin the privacy rights it had announced in Roe, and it dreaded the
slippery slope it might slide down. In
addition, it faced a substantive question-euthanasia--whose slopes were
notoriously slippery, whose contours
had changed with chastening speed,
and whose future dimensions were
disturbingly murky. Thus, however
the justices may have assessed the
ethical merits of the Cruzans' position, whatever their views of good
public policy, and however seductive
the idiom of rights, they fuced strong
systemic reasons not to create a right
to die.
This leads us to a third limitation of
thinking about bioethical problems

in legal terms. Law is a system of social
regulation, and social regulation is
the art of the possible and the necessary. Out of a sense of what is normatively desirable and practically possible, American law seeks only to plan
a bare framework for society and not
a complete blueprint for it Our law
does not-unlike civil law-even
aspire itself to be a complete system.
Thus there are often gaps in legal
doctrine where legal institutions have
not fully dealt with an issue.
One such limitation arises from the
fact that our judicial system is primarily driven by litigants. Cases they
do not bring cannot be a<ljudicated.
Arguments they do not make will not
be heard. Another limitation arises
from the fact that law relies on precedent. Propositions for which there is
no precedent will have trouble
making their way into law. One example of this "incompleteness" problem appears in the law of rights. That
law has historically flourished in one
paradigmatic situation-where a
single individual confronts the state.
VIrtually all rights thinking in American law is organized around that paradigm. "In such conflicts," as I once
wrote, "we are predisposed to favor
the person, out of respect for his
moral autonomy and human dignity.
That predisposition also rests on our
assumption that the state can bear
any risks of an incorrect decision better than the individual can."n But in
bioethics the conflict often is not between one person and the state, but
between two people, each with a
claim against the other and each with
a rights claim against the state. Our
legal rights doctrine tells us little
about how to make such choices because those are not situations the law
was designed to cope with.
Pregnancy contracts exemplify this
problem. In the Baby M case, did Mr.
Stern have a constitutional right to
father a child in this way? Did Mrs.
Whitehead have a constitutional
right to raise Melissa, the child she
had borne? Did Melissa have a constitutional right to a decision made in
her best interests? To be reared by
her natural mother? To stay in touch
with both her natural parents? Little
in our crude and crabbed doctrine of
constitutional rights helps answer
those questions.

In this section, I have observed that
law's language can enrich bioethics'
discussion of the moral and public
policy issues that subject treats. Yet I
suggested that courts and legislatures
speak a language shaped by the
special exigencies of a legal system of
social regulation, a language that is
easily misunderstood by an unwary
public and that fits uneasily with the
language of bioethical reflection. In
particular, I discussed that part of the
law's language closest to the mainsprings of bioethical discourse-the
law's rights talk. I suggested that
rights talk is narrow enough to begin
with. Ladd, for instance, profitably
contrasts that talk with a broader discourse, the language of "responsibility." In bioethics, "a responsible decision may require consideration of
such different things as risks and
benefits, other relationships, concerns, needs and abilities of persons
affected by and affecting the decision. In addition, to make responsible
decisions it is usually necessary to
'weight' a number of factors against
each other; the final decision often
requires what we generally call judgment.'" He contrasts rights talk: "Decisions based on rights, on the other
hand, are quite different. They do
not permit taking into account most
of the considerations mentioned,
and they do not involve the same
kind of weighing, deliberation, judgment, etc., that is called for in cases of
responsibility. "12
But rights talk in the law is importantly more limited even than in
ethics, for the apparent similarity of
the law's rights talk and bioethics' autonomy principle is misleading. Bioethics can describe a principle of autonomy complex and modulated
enough to assimilate the full range of
relevant moral considerations. But
the law is constrained by its function
as an agency of social regulation. It
must find authority in legal precedent, fit its rights principles into a
demanding context, and articulate
rights doctrines that can be translated
into the day-to-day work of courts,
lawyers, and citizens. Such factors are
inevitable in any system of law. However, they corrode the wide-ranging,
subtle, and complex principles necessary to a system of ethics. And they
suggest one reason that some bioethi-
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cal versions of the autonomy principle will not readily be transformed
into law.
Political and Judicial Questions

This leads us to law's second advantage as a language of bioethical discourse. Perhaps law's most beguiling
aspect is that it is notjust talk. It is also
a way of actively, directly trying to
change the world. It is not the only
way, nor always the best way, but it has
conspicuous attractions.
The first such attraction is that law
embodies an already established enforcement structure. Further, that
structure is backed, ultimately, by
society's fiercest instruments of coercion. For instance, the fear of criminal prosecution even today influences-and some say, should influence-decisions about terminating
medical treatment And opponents of
abortion precisely want to use the criminal law to prevent abortions.
But law is not just a structure of
regulation backed by force. Law also
enjoys social and moral authority.
Laws are often obeyed because
people believe they should obey the
law. And people are subtly but truly
influenced by the law's expressive
capacity (which exploits the law's
power to impart ideas through words
and symbols) and by the social force
(the force of familiarity, custom, and
legitimacy) acquired by institutions
the law supports. This is, for instance,
one defense of the law of informed
consent: even though recalcitrant
doctors may evade it, it symbolizes
society's aspirations for medicine.
That symbol, over time, supported by
an emerging practice, and taken with
other legal and social measures, may
gradually prevail in the minds and
methods of doctors.
The law is an appealing device for
change for yet another reasonthere are so many points of access to
it. The law can be reached through
the instruments of democracy and
through litigation, all means available
(in principle) to anyone. This helps
explain why people trying to challenge, for instance, the institutional
authority of medicine and the individual power of doctors have sought
to speak in the voice of the law.

Despite these attractions, almost all
laymen and too many lawyers grossly
overestimate the law's precision and
reach. Why does law so often fail to
translate hopes into reality? Once
again, it is crucial that law is a system
of social regulation. Bioethical reflection can analyze each case meticulously to seek the right result for that
case. But a system of social regulation
cannot trust each decisionmaker to
make each case right. Nor can it
tolerate discretion's inconsistency
and unpredictability. Further, a wisely
considered and carefully formulated
rule may produce the right result in
more cases than the ad hoc efforts of
individual decisionmakers. For all
these reasons, justice may require
that an agency of social regulation
substitute rules for discretion. Further, considerations of efficiency may
lead to the same result. As Alfred
North Whitehead wonderfully wrote,
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by copy-books and
by eminent people when they are
making speeches, that we should
cultivate the habit of thinking
about what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the
number of important operations
which we can perform without
thinking about them. Operations
of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle-they are strictly
limited in number, they require
fresh horses, and must only be
made at decisive moments. 13
But of course, when you adopt a
rule, you risk diminishing the chance
of doing exact justice in every case,
since rules by their nature sweep
many somewhat diverse cases into a
single category. This is the problem
the Missouri legislature faced in the
statute tested in Cruzan. That statute's
rule set a high standard of evidence
for terminating treatment The legislature presumably calculated that
making such decisions discretionary
was likelier to produce more "errors"
than the rule it adopted. Similarly,
some states have concluded that a
rule prohibiting pregnancy contracts
will yield more good results than a
series of discretionary decisions
about enforcing each specific contract. But both rules pay a cost in

wrong decisions, as the facts of
Cruzan suggest
Rules have another drawback.
They must be so clear and comprehensible that the people who apply
them will understand them. Yet clarity exacts a cost in justice. This pro~
lem plagues bioethics. For example,
doctors reasonably complain that tort
law's hazy "reasonable patient" standard tells them frustratingly little
about their duties. Yet critics who
want a doctrine of informed consent
with real bite reasonably complain
that a clearer standard would leave
uncovered the numerous unforeseen
situations that ought to be covered.
In all these ways, then, the language of the law must give up something-and sometimes a great dealin precision and in sensitivity because
of the contexts in which law is actually
applied. But there is a further, deeper
problem. One of the great truths
about law is that with unnerving
frequency, it fails to achieve the effects intended for it, and sometimes
quite fails to have any effect at all.
Some of the most fascinating modern
legal scholarship reminds lawyers
how removed their talk is from the
world's ken. That literature reveals
that, to the lawyer's chagrin, businesses resist using contracts, ranchers
do not know what rules of liability
govern damage done by wandering
cattle, suburbanites do not summon
the law to resolve neighborhood disputes, engaged couples do not know
the law governing how they will own
property when they marry, citizens
repeatedly reject the due process protections offered them, and, what is
worse, all these people simply don't
care what the law says. 14
Much the same can be said of many
of the law's recent bioethical reforms.
There is evidence that as few as 10
percent of us have made an advance
directive, that only a quarter of us
have signed an organ donor card
(despite the swarms of us who say we
want to be donors), that even competent patients are not widely consulted about do-not-resuscitate orders, that doctors have reduced informed consent to one more bureaucratic chore, and that plaintiffs rarely
win informed consent suits.
What is going on here? Well, of
course, lots of things. But central
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among them is society's enormous
complexity and the narrow relevance
of the law to it People are enticed by
many pressures beyond those the law
creates. They have their own agendas
and, more important, their own normative systems. The law writes rules,
but the governed-when they know
the rules--often have the incentives,
time, and energy to avoid them.
Consider advance directives. They
offer an apparently irresistible way of
speaking in one of life's greatest
crises. Yet people spurn them. They
do so because they have their own
lives to lead. Momentous as the crisis
may be, it will generally not seem urgent until it arrives. People resist contemplating their own mortality. They
heartily dislike and don't easily understand legal forms; they find them
obscure and darkly imagine how they
might be misused. For that matter,
people may doubt that they will be
used at all. Further, many people
have trouble envisioning their circumstances years into the future or
how they would respond to those hypothetical circumstances. And I suspect that people expect that decisions
about their welfare would in any case
fall to people they trust-to their
families. In short, advance directives
were formulated and promoted by
people-bioethicists, lawyers, and
doctors, for instance-who know
what they want to do through them
and keenly want to do it But many of
us are not clear about what we want
and about whether getting it is worth
the costs.
In short, while the language of the
law may have penetrated into the
bosom of society, it must still, in
quotidian life, compete with the
many other languages that people
speak more comfortably, more
fluently, and with much more conviction. These are languages of religion
and morality, of love and friendship,
of pragmatism and social accommodation, of custom and compromise.
The danger for bioethicists, then, is
believing too deeply that law can
pierce the Babel, can speak with precision, can be heard.

The Spirit of the Law
I have tried to show how law's function as an agency of social regulation

produces a language that, despite its
uses and attractions, can be an inapt
idiom for bioethical discourse and
even for transforming bioethical
principles into social policy. I now
want to propose that "sociopsychologically," if not logically, that language may tend to sway us in undesirable directions. I will suggest two of
them.
Let me give a brief example of my
first concern. Every year I ask my (law
and medical) students whether they
have any moral obligation to give
blood. They immediately bristle and
tell me that the law should not require people to make such donations.
I repeat what I have already told
them, that I am not asking about legal
duties, but about moral ones. They
reply that no such obligation should
be imposed on them, whether by law
or any other outside force. When I
ask why those of them who have given
blood have done so, they say that they
happen, purely as an arbitrary matter
of personal preference, to want to do
so. Like the subjects of Habits of the
Heart, even their "deepest ethical virtues are justified as matters of personal preference. "15
I think this story has many explanations. The one relevant to our problem begins with the observation that
law generally conceives of problems
in terms of rights, whether constitutional or not. This promotes binethics' own legalistic tendencies, for
"it is hardly an exaggeration to say
that discussions of medical ethics
often amount to little more than
glosses on the rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. "16 It is
often desirable for people to look on
their relations with government in
rights terms. It is sometimes necessary for people to look on their relations with other people in those
terms. But making rights central to
one's world view carries a danger:
Thinking in terms of rights encourages us to ask what we may do
to free ourselves, not to bind ourselves. It encourages us to think
about what constrains us from
doing what we want, not what obligates us to do what we ought.
Legal rights are tellingly different
from moral rights in this respect:
When philosophers talk about

rights, they commonly talk about
a complex web of relationships
and duties between individuals;
when lawyers talk about rights,
they commonly talk about areas
of liberty to act without interference.17
This tendency of rights thinking is
exacerbated in the United States by
the feeling that to assert one's rights
is a virtue, that "to demand our
rights, to assert ourselves as the moral
agents we are, is to be able to demand
that we be dealt with as members of
. o f h uman b emgs.
.
"18
the community
In dealing with the government, this
may often be true. However,
attitudes appropriate to civil
rights may be inappropriate to
privacy rights. Civil rights are
rights to participate in self-government and society. Such participation is at least a virtue and may
be a duty. But privacy rights are
in a sense the opposite of civil
rights--they are rights not to be
affected by government and society-and to forego their use can
be a virtue and even a duty. 19
One reason rights thinking is so
prevalent in the United States is that
in a self-consciously pluralist and
secular society other sources of value
have lost much of their authority. But
this also aggravates the risks of rights
thinking, for it deprives people of the
incentives for modulating rights
claims that a moral system can supply.
My students vehemently believe that
nothing should bind them to give
blood; only their "arbitrarily" chosen
preferences counsel them to do so.
Nothing in rights thinking requires
this kind of response, but in a world
in which the language of the law has
become a vulgar tongue, that response
comes all too readily to the lips.
Another "sociopsychological" peril
lies in abandoning people to their
rights. If doctors and patients meet
clad in the armor of their rights, both
of them will lose as well as gain: "The
physician who is now instructed to
obey the 'informed consent' of his
patient, no matter how harmful he
feels that action to be for the patient,
is not only permitted but positively
enjoined to separate himself from his
patient, to respect his patient's 'au-
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tonomy' by suppressing his own identifications, his self-confusions, with
that patient. ,2() Robert Zussman suggests that such a separation may be
taking place: "While a number of observers of the medical scene have argued that patients and patient advocates may demand rights in response
to the impersonality of relations with
physicians, few have noted that physicians may also become advocates of
patients' rights in response to the impersonali~ of their relations with
patients ...2 As Charles Bosk writes,
"The dark side of patient autonomy
[is] patient abandonment. "22
Of course, rights thinking has
achieved its present power in bioethics exacdy because of medicine's
long history of paternalism and because of its long prospect of increasingly bureaucratic and impersonal relations between doctor and patient.
The question I raise is about the costs
of responding to these evils in too
legalistic a way: "The worse the society,
the more law there will be. In Hell
there will be nothing but law, and
due process will be meticulously observed."23

The Vulgar Tongue
In this paper, I have argued that law
offers a rewarding language of social
regulation. But I have also contended
that, as a vehicle for discussing
morally consequential issues like
those in bioethical disputes, that language is momentously limited and
often inapt. Law is the language of
social regulation, and hence obeys
systemic imperatives that are irrelevant to and may even conflict with
genuine understanding and wise resolution of moral issues. This is why
Holmes saw himself "as a judge whose
first business is to see that the game is
played according to the rules whether I like them or not. "24 It is why Cardozo thought the judge "is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence.
He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the sociallife.'"25
Of course courts and (much more)
legislatures sometimes speak in moral

terms. But that fact must be understood in light oflaw's task as a system
of social regulation: "The law is full of
phraseology drawn from morals, and
by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one
domain to the other without perceiving it.... Manifesdy, therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of
man in a moral sense are equally
rights in the sense of the Constitution
and the law. "26 Cruzan does not express the Court's belief about whether Nancy Beth Cruzan should have
been allowed to die. Rne does not
state the Court's view of the desirability of Texas's abortion statute. The
law of informed consent does not
embody any legislature's whole sense
of the ethical duties of doctors to
patients. All this sharply and crucially
limits both the extent to which the
language of the law may safely be
imported into bioethical discourse
and to which bioethical ideas may
be effectively translated into law.
We no doubt must live with the :fuct
that the law has become in some
measure a vulgar tongue, that its spirit has penetrated into the bosom of
society. Yet we should remember that
the law's calling is to regulate social
life, however awkwardly, and its language reflects that purpose. That is its
strength. But like any lexicon, law's
vocabularies must be handled cautiously. For its idioms rule us in ways
we do not always grasp or desire, and
they have limits growing out of the
ends for which they were created.
References
1. John Ladd, "Legalism and Medical
Ethics," in Contempurary Issues in Biorrwdical
Ethics, ed.John W. Davis, Barry Hoffmaster, and Sarah Shorten (Totowa, NJ.:
HumanaPress, 1977), pp.13, 14-15.
2. "As most public men are or have
been legal practitioners, they introduced
the customs and technicalities of their
profession into the management of public
affairs." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
America, vol. 1 (New York: Vmtage, 1959),
p. 290.
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path
of the Law," in CoUected Legal Papers (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920), p. 170.
4. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of
the judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 92-93.

5. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity: And Three Brief Essays
(1873; reprint, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), p. 162.
6. Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Murals,
and Political Trials (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 10.
7. Holmes, "Path of the Law," p. 168.
8. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261 (1990).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
10. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial~
cess, p. 51.
11. Carl E. Schneider, "Bioethics and
the Family: The Cautionary View from
Family Law," Utah Law Review 1992, no. 3
(1992): 819-47, at838.
12. Ladd, "Legalism and Medical Ethics," pp. 27-28.
13. Alfred North Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics, rev. ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 61.
14. Two fine examples of this literature
are Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study," American Sociological Review 28
(1963): 55-67, at 55; and Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settl£
Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
15. Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the
Heart: Individuals and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 6.
16. Ladd, "Legalism and Medical Ethics,"p. 6.
17. Carl E. Schneider, "Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia," CalifurniaLawReview76 (1988): 151-76, at 163.
18. A. I. Melden, Rights and Persons
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1977), p. 25.
19. Schneider, "Rights Discourse and
Neonatal Euthanasia," p. 164.
20. Robert A. Burt, "The Limits of
Law in Regulating Health Care Decisions," Hastings Center Repurt 7, no. 6
(1977): 29-32, at 32.
21. Robert Zussman, Intensive Care:
Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992), p. 87.
22. Charles L. Bosk, AlJ God's Mistakes:
Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospital
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992), p. 158.
23. Grant Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican
Law (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977), pp. 110-11.
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Ideals
and Doubts," in CoUected Legal Papers, p.
307.
25. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial ~
cess, p. 141.
26. Holmes, 'ThePathoftheLaw,"pp.
171-72.

22
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Thu, 15 Jun 2017 17:48:29 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

